[T]hese guys at MIT and BBN… We'd all gotten really excited about interactive computing, and we had a kind of little religion growing here about how this was going to be totally different than batch processing… I had this little picture in my mind of how we were going to get people and computers really thinking together. [ARPA director Jack] Ruina was thinking in terms of command and control, and it didn't take really very much to see how this would work. I wanted to get all this done. So I had the notion [that] 'command and control essentially depends on interactive computing so the military really needs this.' I was one of the few people who, I think, had this positive feeling toward the military. It wasn't just to fund our stuff, but they really needed it and they were good guys. So I set out to build this program.
Introduction
Value-sensitive design is a forward-looking enterprise, aiming to integrate human values into the design of technologies. Third, the arrival in 1966 of Larry Roberts at IPTO and the launching of the ARPANET highlights how ARPA could leverage the science policy consensus to achieve its advanced research mission.
This examination of the values of the stakeholders in IPTO research can help us to understand the ways that these values shaped the creation of the ARPANET. The influence of the values expressed by these actors was decisive. They believed that government had an obligation to support a broad base of scientific research to promote both the public good and the national defense; that IPTO-sponsored computing research would accomplish both military and scientific objectives; and that IPTO could leverage its power within this consensus to create a network to share resources and unite researchers over geographical distance.
Science policy "consensus," Sputnik, and ARPA
Historians note a self-conscious "consensus" among both American policymakers and scientists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 3 In the wake of Nazi
Germany and in the face of the Cold War Soviet "menace," Americans fashioned and clung to what historian Arthur Schlesinger has called a "vital center" in order to resist the threat of totalitarianism from the right and the left, and, ultimately, to secure the survival of American liberal democracy into the 1950s and beyond. 4 Policymakers and historians identify a science policy consensus operating among scientists and policymakers during this same period in the first 20 years of the Cold War. Among the tenets of this broad consensus was that the American victory in World War II owed much to the vitality of basic science research, especially advances in physics that led to microwave radar, proximity fuses, solid-fuel rockets, and the atomic bomb. The indisputable lesson was that "national security depended upon research in pure 3 The existence of such a consensus does not deny the existence of widespread resistance to dominant social trends. While SAGE thus set a technological precedent for large, interactive computer systems, it also set the administrative precedent of a computer research project that was of high value both to the academic research community and to the military. IPTO's reliance on "centers of excellence"; the "consonance of interest" between military command and control research and interactive computing already underway at places like MIT and CMU; IPTO's ability quickly to fund significant projects; and almost unquestioning support of IPTO from ARPA, the DoD, and Congress. The fact is, as I see it, that the military greatly needs solutions to many or most of the problems that will arise if we tried to make good use of the [computing] facilities that are coming into existence. I am hoping that there will be, in our individual efforts, enough evident advantage in cooperative programming and operation to lead us to solve the problems and, thus, to bring into being the technology that the military needs.
Centers of Excellence
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In retrospect, Licklider's achievement was to articulate his vision for interactive computing in a way that would appeal to both the military and to academic and private computer researchers. Licklider's work as director of IPTO shows how he was able to create a consensus around his vision to explore new frontiers:
The technical need is definite in command and control, and also urgent; at the same time, in almost every area of human activity that involves information processing, there is the possibility of a profound advance, which will be almost literally an advance in the way of thinking. My understanding of the mechanism was that if I could convince the ARPA director that something was sensible to do, it got done… I always felt the principal hurdle was to convince the ARPA director that it was a sensible task. I guess Al Blue [IPTO administrator, 1965 [IPTO administrator, -1977 and the administrative machinery ran smoothly enough that the ARPA orders got written. IPTO had the autonomy and the money to fund what they perceived to be smart people and good research. As Allan Blue recalled of the era before the passage of the Mansfield Amendment in 1970, 40 IPTO was an environment in which you gave money to good people and expected good results. There was no concern with relevance… if a program manager has a good idea, he has got two people to convince that that is a good idea before the guy goes to work. He has got the director of his office and the director of ARPA, and that is it. Without exception, the individuals involved in these "early days" of networking express pride that their research was supported and allowed to blossom. As Herzfeld reflected in 1990, Licklider predicted the future of computing in America remarkably well… [Licklider] said, 'We clearly can do the following. It makes sense and we ought to do it, so let's go do it.' And indeed, it happened. Networking, interactive graphics, time-sharing, and all these things that are now so commonplace were in the air, and he saw to it that they would happen. What was initially a move that Taylor called "blackmail" soon became an opportunity for Roberts, 28 years old at the time, to pursue his goal of sharing the research of the computer science community with a broader audience. Roberts recalled, I was also coming to the point of view, separately from that [Herzfeld's "51%" phone call], that this research was not getting to the rest of the world… I was feeling we were now probably twenty years ahead of what anybody was going to use and still there was no path for them to pick up… So I was really feeling a pull towards getting more into the real world, rather than remain in that sort of an ivory tower… So they eventually convinced me it was a good idea-particularly after Lincoln said that was the best place for me. Well, the universities were being funded by us, and we said, "We are going to build a network and you are going to participate in it. And you are going to connect it to your machines. By virtue of that we are going to reduce our computing demands on the office. So that you understand, we are not going to buy you new computers until you have used up all of the resources of the network. So over time we started forcing them to be involved, because the universities in general did not want to share their computers with anybody.
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Just as Roberts and his boss at Lincoln Lab in 1966 had no choice but to give in to ARPA's demands, the IPTO-funded PIs were more or less coerced into making their computers part of the ARPANET. But, also like Roberts, the PIs came to appreciate the results of the "arm-twisting." According to Roberts, the pioneers of Artificial
Intelligence at MIT and Stanford, Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy, initially hated the fact that somebody else might use their computer. They found that to be a gross invasion of their privacy. Eventually, they applauded it because they could copy each others' papers! They could get at the writing of each others' groups and that sort of thing, so they found the communication valuable to their own groups. But initially, they were very negative. I still remember them fighting all along the way. 
Conclusion
Recent historiography of the Cold War and of Cold War computing points to "containment" metaphors and "closed world discourse" as dominant themes of the period between 1945 and the present. In contrast to these metaphors and themes, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the theme of "consensus" served as a In 2001 we may look to the influence of similarly broad issues such as the features of "globalization" that tend toward global economic and social integration and stratification, and frequently pit corporate interests against scientific or "public"
interests. The broader themes of globalization already have influenced public policy debates in broadband and wireless deployment and the "digital divide." Security researchers complain of the "chilling effects" of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on their efforts to create more secure systems and encryption techniques. 59 Scholars of globalization also detect familiar themes in debates about the nature of intellectual property and whether software engineering should follow a proprietary model or, instead, a competing "open source" model. 60 A startling transpartisan alliance between House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) and the American Civil Liberties Union highlights the broad-based concern with the increasing threats to privacy posed by public surveillance systems. 61 As historical analysis clearly demonstrates, these and other broad value conflicts will continue to exert significant influence on the design and governance of cyberspace.
